Self-Defense Without Restraint: Legal Narratives and Gulf Escalation

By Luciano Zaccara

Principal Researcher

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Abstract

This article argues that the expanding use of self-defense in the Gulf confrontation is increasingly functioning as a permissive narrative rather than a legal constraint. Israeli, U.S., and Iranian actions illustrate how elastic interpretations of imminence, necessity, and proportionality are blurring the boundary between lawful and unlawful force. The paper shows how legally ambiguous retaliation has regionalized the conflict, increased risks of misperception, and constrained de-escalation. It contends that the erosion of credible legal limits is not only a normative concern but a strategic one, as it embeds instability and reduces diplomatic flexibility. Re-establishing meaningful constraints on the use of force is therefore essential to preserving de-escalation in the Gulf.

Resumen 

Este artículo sostiene que el uso expansivo de la legítima defensa en la actual confrontación en el Golfo está funcionando cada vez más como una narrativa permisiva, que como una restricción jurídica. Las acciones de Israel, Estados Unidos e Irán muestran cómo interpretaciones elásticas de la inminencia, la necesidad y la proporcionalidad están difuminando la frontera entre el uso lícito e ilícito de la fuerza. El texto analiza cómo represalias jurídicamente ambiguas han regionalizado el conflicto, aumentado los riesgos de mal interpretación y limitando las posibilidades de desescalada. Concluye que la erosión de límites jurídicos creíbles no es solo un problema normativo, sino también estratégico, ya que consolida la inestabilidad y reduce el margen diplomático.

Introduction

The current cycle of confrontation in and around the Gulf is increasingly being fought not only on the battlefield but also in the legal domain. Israeli and United States strikes against Iranian targets, and Iran’s subsequent retaliatory operations affecting military facilities and strategic energy infrastructure across Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and other regional states, have all been framed as acts of self-defense. Yet the cumulative pattern suggests that the concept is progressively being used less as a legal constraint and more as a strategic enabler. Rather than stabilizing deterrence, expansive self-defense claims are contributing to the erosion of normative thresholds governing the use of force and, in doing so, are narrowing the political space for de-escalation. This argument builds on earlier observations that legal vocabulary has progressively been instrumentalized to manage alliances and normalize limited but repeated uses of force across the region. It also connects to the broader concern that moralized and securitized narratives of war have raised the political and diplomatic costs of restraint, making de-escalation structurally more difficult to pursue.

The central problem is not that states invoke self-defense, it is that the concept has been stretched to a degree that risks emptying it of operational meaning. When virtually any military action can be framed as anticipatory, preventive, retaliatory, or deterrence-restoring self-defense, the distinction between lawful and unlawful force becomes increasingly blurred. In such an environment, escalation dynamics are driven less by legal thresholds and more by strategic signaling, domestic legitimacy concerns, and alliance expectations. The result is a security environment in which legality becomes instrumentalized and invoked selectively to legitimize force rather than to discipline it.

Expanding self-defense beyond its traditional boundaries

Under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the inherent right of self-defense is triggered in response to an armed attack and must be exercised according to the principles of necessity and proportionality. In recent months, however, the interpretation of these criteria has become progressively elastic.

Israeli and U.S. attacks against Iranian military and nuclear-related facilities have been justified as pre-emptive or preventive measures aimed at neutralizing imminent threats. From a strategic standpoint, such reasoning reflects longstanding doctrines of anticipatory self-defense. From a legal standpoint, however, the evidentiary threshold for imminence remains contested. The shift toward structurally defined imminence (threats framed as enduring or systemic rather than immediate) risks normalizing a doctrine of open-ended preventive force. When imminence is defined in such broad terms, the temporal link between threat and response becomes attenuated, weakening the credibility of legal restraint as a meaningful operational standard.

Iran’s retaliatory strikes present a different but equally complex challenge. Tehran has argued that attacks on U.S. military assets hosted in GCC countries, as well as operations targeting oil and gas infrastructure, were legitimate acts of self-defense in response to external aggression. The logic rests on the premise that host states facilitating or enabling hostile operations may become lawful targets. Yet such reasoning risks conflating direct participation in hostilities with broader alliance relationships. The growing pattern of strikes affecting energy production, export logistics, and dual-use infrastructure in third-party states amplifies the perception that proportionality assessments are increasingly subordinated to coercive signaling imperatives. The targeting of critical civilian infrastructure, particularly in third-party states, therefore raises serious questions regarding proportionality and distinction under international humanitarian law.

The strategic costs of legally ambiguous retaliation

The legal ambiguity surrounding these uses of force has tangible strategic consequences. On one hand, it complicates crisis management by reducing the availability of mutually recognized red lines. When each actor claims legal justification for escalation, diplomatic mediation loses an important normative anchor. Mediators, including regional broker states, find it harder to frame ceasefire proposals around shared legal expectations, as parties perceive their own actions as fundamentally legitimate. Recent diplomatic exchanges illustrate that even technical de-confliction channels struggle to function effectively when legal narratives harden into political absolutes.

On the other hand, attacks on energy infrastructure in GCC states introduce a regionalization dynamic that extends the conflict beyond its original bilateral or trilateral scope. Even when intended primarily as deterrence signaling toward Washington or Tel Aviv, such strikes generate insecurity among Gulf states whose strategic calculus has increasingly emphasized de-escalation and economic stability. The resulting perception of vulnerability can prompt these states to enhance defensive alignments, potentially deepening bloc polarization in the regional security architecture. In this sense, retaliatory actions framed as defensive risk paradoxically accelerating the securitization of Gulf economic space.

Besides, the normalization of legally contested uses of force increases the risk of misperception. In an environment where legal rhetoric serves strategic messaging functions, adversaries may interpret defensive narratives as mere justification devices rather than genuine signals of limited intent. This dynamic can produce escalation spirals driven by worst-case assumptions rather than calibrated deterrence logic. As retaliatory cycles become more geographically diffuse and economically consequential, the probability of inadvertent escalation correspondingly rises.

Self-defense narratives and domestic legitimacy

Another dimension often overlooked is the domestic political utility of self-defense claims. Governments under external pressure or facing internal legitimacy challenges may rely on legal-moral narratives to consolidate support. In the United States and Israel, framing operations as defensive responses helps maintain public backing for sustained military engagement. In Iran, presenting retaliatory strikes as lawful resistance reinforces regime narratives of sovereignty protection and strategic resilience.

However, while such narratives can be effective domestically, they may have the unintended effect of narrowing diplomatic flexibility. Leaders who publicly anchor their policies in legal righteousness may find it politically costly to accept compromises that appear inconsistent with their stated justifications. This phenomenon contributes to prolonged confrontation cycles even when underlying strategic interests might favor de-escalation. Over time, the internalization of maximalist defensive narratives risks locking decision-makers into escalation-prone strategic postures.

The erosion of proportionality as a stabilizing principle

Proportionality has historically functioned not only as a legal standard but also as an informal stabilizing mechanism in regional conflicts. Limited retaliation, calibrated to signal resolve without provoking systemic escalation, has often allowed adversaries to claim symbolic victory while preserving strategic restraint.

Recent developments suggest a weakening of this logic. The scale and geographic reach of retaliatory actions, particularly those affecting energy production and export infrastructure, signal a willingness to raise the economic and geopolitical costs of confrontation. The cumulative disruption of energy security expectations in the Gulf marks a qualitative shift from symbolic signaling to structurally consequential coercion. While such measures may enhance short-term deterrence credibility, they simultaneously increase the structural stakes of the conflict. As energy markets react and external powers recalibrate their positions, the conflict becomes embedded in broader global dynamics that are harder to contain through bilateral signaling alone.

Re-anchoring de-escalation in legal and political realism

Acknowledging the limits of self-defense as a justificatory framework does not imply denying states their legitimate security concerns. Rather, it underscores the need to distinguish between strategic necessity and legal sufficiency. Actions perceived as operationally rational may still undermine the normative environment required for sustainable conflict management. The persistence of retaliatory actions lacking clear legal grounding illustrates how deterrence practices can unintentionally weaken the very order they seek to stabilize.

For regional actors, particularly GCC states that have invested in diplomatic brokerage and economic diversification, the priority lies in restoring predictability. This requires reinforcing the principle that the use of force against third-party civilian infrastructure, even under retaliatory logic, carries long-term destabilizing effects. Similarly, external powers must recognize that expansive interpretations of anticipatory self-defense risk legitimizing reciprocal escalation by adversaries. Without renewed normative discipline, deterrence signaling is likely to evolve into a pattern of competitive escalation with diminishing prospects for negotiated restraint.

Policy advice for GCC states

Rather than responding through alignment or reactive securitization, GCC states are better positioned to consolidate their role as broker-hybrids within an increasingly fragmented regional order. This implies prioritizing the protection of economic security space, particularly critical energy infrastructure, while maintaining diplomatic channels with all parties involved in the confrontation. In a context where expansive self-defense claims are eroding normative constraints, the strategic value of the GCC lies less in deterrence projection than in preserving the conditions for de-escalation. The strategic priority of the GCC states should be to preserve the conditions for de-escalation even while enhancing deterrence projection. This will allow them not to be fully embedded in competing escalation logics and to retain the possibility of engaging in long-term strategic solutions.

Conclusion

Self-defense remains a cornerstone of international order, but its stabilizing function depends on disciplined interpretation and credible restraint. In the present Gulf confrontation, the expansive and often competing invocation of defensive justification has instead contributed to normalizing escalation and weakening shared expectations about the limits of force. The widening targeting of economically strategic infrastructure illustrates how deterrence signaling, when detached from clear legal grounding, risks transforming episodic crises into structurally embedded insecurity. Re-establishing meaningful normative boundaries around proportionality, distinction, and the protection of civilian economic assets is therefore not only a legal necessity but a strategic condition for restoring political space for de-escalation in a progressively fragmented regional order.

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