From Gaza to Iran: How Legal Narratives Manage Alliances and Normalize Force

By Luciano Zaccara

Principal Researcher

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English Abstract

This article argues that in the contemporary Middle East, legal narratives have become an operational tool of alliance management rather than merely a constraint on the use of force. Through the lens of “conflict without labels,” it shows how terms such as self-defense, limited strike, or incident allow governments to preserve coalition cohesion, reduce diplomatic costs, and manage escalation. Gaza illustrates how intense legal contestation and humanitarian scrutiny can coexist with resilient alliances through strategic compartmentalization.

The Iran file demonstrates how escalation can be prepared in advance through legal framing combined with diplomacy, military signaling, and domestic volatility. For Gulf states, this dynamic raises structural concerns about sovereignty and exposure to retaliation. The article concludes that the normalization of force occurs gradually through linguistic adjustment; disciplining escalation therefore requires disciplining the language that defines it.

Resúmen en español

Este artículo sostiene que en el Oriente Medio contemporáneo las narrativas jurídicas se han convertido en una herramienta de gestión de alianzas más que en un simple límite al uso de la fuerza. A partir del concepto de “conflicto sin etiquetas”, se muestra cómo términos como legítima defensa, ataque limitado o incidente permiten preservar la cohesión de las coaliciones, reducir costos diplomáticos y administrar la escalada. El caso de Gaza ejemplifica cómo una intensa controversia legal puede coexistir con alianzas resilientes mediante una compartimentación estratégica.

El expediente iraní evidencia cómo la escalada puede prepararse de antemano mediante encuadres jurídicos combinados con diplomacia, señalización militar y volatilidad interna. Para los Estados del Golfo, ello plantea riesgos estructurales para la soberanía y la exposición a represalias. La normalización de la fuerza, concluye el artículo, avanza gradualmente a través de ajustes en el lenguaje; por tanto, gestionar la escalada implica también disciplinar las palabras que la legitiman.

ملخص المقال باللغة العربية

تعد السرديات القانونية مجرد كوابح شكلية لاستخدام القوة، بل تحولت إلى أداة عملية لإدارة التحالفات في المنطقة. وفي زمن "الصراعات غير المُسمّاة"، يتناول هذا المقال كيف تحافظ الحكومات على تماسك تحالفاتها وتدير التصعيد بأقل التكاليف الدبلوماسية، من خلال توظيف مصطلحات مثل "الدفاع عن النفس" أو "الضربات المحدودة" أو "الحوادث العابرة"."

ويبرز قطاع غزة كحالة دراسية توضح كيف يتم التوفيق بين استمرارية التحالفات العميقة من جهة، وبين حدّة الجدل القانوني والتدقيق الإنساني من جهة أخرى، وذلك عبر "الفصل الاستراتيجي" بين المسارين. أما في الملف الإيراني، فيوضح المقال أن التحضير للتصعيد يمرّ عبر صياغة قانونية محكمة، تترافق مع الضغط العسكري الميداني والدبلوماسية النشطة بالتوازي.

وتثير هذه الديناميكية مخاوف بنيوية لدى دول الخليج تتعلق بسيادتها و الاستهداف الانتقامي. ويخلص المقال إلى أن تطبيع استخدام القوة يتسلل تدريجياً عبر التلاعب اللغوي؛ لذا فإن ضبط التصعيد يستوجب بالضرورة ضبط اللغة التي تُعرِّفه.

Introduction

In the Middle East, the legal framing of military action is no longer just something that happens after the fact, it is increasingly part of the strategy itself. Legal language has become a way to keep alliances intact, reduce diplomatic costs, and shape escalation before it spirals.

As I previously described as “conflict without labels” in the Gulf context, governments avoid calling something a “war” not because violence is minor, but because the political consequences of that label are too costly for coalitions. The vocabulary matters. It defines how much escalation partners are willing to tolerate.

Gaza has been the most visible example of this dynamic. But the Iran file may prove even major strike, through diplomacy, threats, and force posture. The Gulf sits inside that dynamic.

When law becomes part of alliance management

The traditional understanding of international law and force is simple; law constrains military action. The UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force, except in cases of self-defense; that is the doctrinal baseline. In practice, however, law also serves a second function, it helps manage political relationships. In a region structured by overlapping security partnerships, basing agreements, and diplomatic dependencies, maintaining coalition unity is often as important as battlefield outcomes.

However, legal vocabulary provides flexibility. A strike can be described as “defensive,” retaliation can be framed as “limited,” and escalation can be called an “incident.” Each of these labels allow partners to remain aligned while signaling nuance to domestic audiences. Over time, this flexibility has consequences. The more frequently force is packaged as limited, necessary, or exceptional, the more routine it becomes. The threshold between extraordinary and normal gradually shifts.

Gaza as a laboratory

Gaza has exposed, in real time, how legal language operates under extreme political pressure. The war has generated extensive documentation of civilian harm and violations of international humanitarian law, including findings by diverse UN bodies that confirms the concerns about genocide committed during the war. These findings are not marginal; they sit at the center of international debate. Yet what is politically striking is not only the severity of the legal contestation, but the resilience of coalition structures around it.

Despite mounting humanitarian criticism and legal scrutiny, key alliances have held. Military assistance has continued. Diplomatic protection has remained largely intact. The Board of Peace, which is a U.S.-led reconstruction and governance mechanism, illustrates how post-conflict political engineering can proceed even while fundamental questions about conduct, proportionality, and accountability remain unresolved. This is not neutrality; it is strategic compartmentalization. Allies separate strategic alignment from legal discomfort. They endorse the broader objective while compartmentalizing objections about means. Legal language, proportionality, humanitarian access, and civilian protection, become a way to register concern without breaking alignment.

The consequence is subtle but significant. When large-scale force can be accompanied by sustained coalition cohesion, the political cost of repetition decreases. What begins as an exceptional response to an extraordinary event, risks becoming a template for managing future escalations. The issue is not that disagreement exists. The issue is that disagreement no longer disrupts alignment. And that is what makes Gaza a laboratory.

Iran: escalation prepared in advance

If Gaza shows how coalitions are managed during war, the Iran file shows how coalitions are managed before war. In late February, U.S.–Iran talks resumed in Geneva, with both sides signaling interest in keeping diplomacy alive despite mounting tension. Reports suggest that Washington is not currently insisting on “zero enrichment,” while Tehran is not offering suspension; formulations that leave space for a face-saving compromise framed as tougher than 2015 but short of maximalist demands.

Iran has reportedly floated ideas such as sending part of its highly enriched uranium abroad, diluting some stockpiles, and discussing a regional enrichment consortium, while still insisting on its sovereign right to enrich, in line with the previous sustained commitments with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency. This is not only negotiation; it is coalition politics. It buys time, divides those pushing for military options, and keeps Gulf actors invested in diplomacy.

At the same time, the military backdrop has grown sharper. Recently published reports indicated that U.S. contingency planning includes options ranging from targeted strikes to potentially destabilizing leadership decapitation scenarios. Meanwhile, internal instability complicates the picture. The January protests were accompanied by a major digital blackout, a reminder that in moments of internal stress the regime treats connectivity as a security domain. Student demonstrations have re-emerged across several universities as well in late February, signaling that the protest cycle is not simply episodic, and that domestic volatility remains part of the strategic backdrop against which Tehran negotiates and Washington signals. Domestic volatility interacts with external signaling. It affects how urgency is framed, how threats are justified, and how partners interpret escalation risk.

This mixture —diplomacy under pressure, military signaling, and internal unrest— creates an environment where legal language becomes essential for coalition stability. Those who favor diplomacy need legal framing to defend continued engagement. Those who favor coercion need legal framing to justify action. In both cases, law becomes the mechanism that holds alliances together.

The Gulf problem

For Gulf states, the core issue is sovereignty. When major powers confront each other, Gulf territory often becomes operationally relevant through basing, airspace, interception systems, or retaliation risks. In these contexts, how an action is labeled matters. Calling something a “limited strike” or an “incident” may reduce political temperature. But it can also blur the question of whether sovereignty has been violated. If third-state exposure to retaliation is treated as secondary to coalition cohesion, the region becomes easier to use as a signaling arena.

The gradual normalization of force does not happen through dramatic legal ruptures. It happens through repeated language adjustments. If threats are treated as routine diplomacy; if limited strikes are treated as manageable events; if self-defense becomes a political reflex rather than a carefully bounded exception; then escalation risk becomes embedded in everyday politics. That is the structural concern.

What can Gulf States realistically do?

The objective is not to demand neutrality or rupture alliances. It is to avoid the silent erosion of sovereignty. Three practical habits matter.

First, consistency in public language. Cross-border kinetic actions should be described in neutral, legally precise terms, regardless of the actor involved. Selective vocabulary weakens credibility.

 Second, transparency expectations. When self-defense is invoked, partners can request clarity on necessity, proportionality, and scope without endorsing or rejecting the claim. Clarity disciplines rhetoric.

 Third, consultation thresholds. If an operation foreseeably increases the risk a host state, that state must be treated as decision-relevant. Sovereignty cannot function as an afterthought. None of these steps require choosing sides. They require setting expectations.

Conclusion: Escalation begins in language

The link between Gaza and Iran cases is not ideological, it is structural. Gaza showed that coalitions can survive intense military action through careful legal differentiation. The Iran file shows that escalation can be prepared through legal framing even before force is used. Legal narratives are not decorative. They shape what partners can tolerate. For Gulf states, the strategic task is straightforward but difficult: prevent alliance management from redefining sovereignty. If the region cannot discipline the language of force, it will struggle to discipline the limits of force. And in an environment of “conflict without labels,” normalization is the real escalation.

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