The Collapse of Deterrence? Revisiting the Iran–Israel–U.S. Three-Body Problem After the June 2025 Escalation

By Luciano Zaccara

Principal Researcher

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English abstract

This article explores the volatile strategic triad between Iran, Israel, and the United States through the metaphor of the three-body problem, highlighting how structural instability and conflicting goals undermine sustained deterrence. Using the June 2025 escalation as a case study, it argues for adaptive crisis management over traditional deterrence frameworks.

Resúmen en español

Este artículo explora la volátil tríada estratégica entre Irán, Israel y Estados Unidos mediante la metáfora del problema de los tres cuerpos, destacando cómo la inestabilidad estructural y los objetivos enfrentados socavan una disuasión sostenida. Usando la escalada de junio de 2025 como estudio de caso, se aboga por una gestión adaptativa de crisis en lugar de marcos tradicionales de disuasión

ملخص المقال باللغة العربية

يتناول هذا المقال الديناميكية الاستراتيجية المعقدة بين إيران وإسرائيل والولايات المتحدة من خلال مفهوم معضلة الأجسام الثلاثة في علم الفيزياء، موضحًا كيف يؤثر عدم الاستقرار الهيكلي والأهداف المتضاربة بين هذه الدول على مفهوم الردع المستدام. وبتحليل تصعيد يونيو 2025 كحالة دراسية، يبرز المقال من خلال مفهوم معضلة الأجسام الثلاثة أهمية إدارة الأزمات بشكل تكيفي بدلاً من اعتماد الأطر التقليدية للردع .

Introduction

In classical mechanics, the “three-body problem”^[1] refers to the challenge of predicting the motion of three gravitational bodies interacting in space. Unlike the possible solutions in a two-body system, the three-body problem resists a general solution, with orbits often chaotic, unpredictable, and prone to sudden changes. In contemporary Middle East geopolitics, a similar configuration has emerged: Iran, Israel, and the United States form a volatile triad whose interactions, like their celestial counterparts, defy equilibrium and challenge enduring stability.

The recent confrontation in June 2025—Israel’s airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran’s massive missile response, and the subsequent U.S. intervention through selective bombings and ceasefire mediation—reveals the dynamics of a strategic system governed by fluctuating alignments, rivalries, and external pressures. This triadic relationship, like the astrophysical three-body problem, generates inherently unstable motion, highly sensitive to minor provocations and vulnerable to cascading consequences.

Stable Configuration, Sensitivity to Initial Conditions

In a two-body system—such as the U.S. and Iran—mutual deterrence or diplomatic engagement can yield relatively predictable results. But the introduction of a third actor—Israel—destroys any potential balance. Each actor pursues fundamentally incompatible goals: Iran seeks strategic autonomy and nuclear deterrence; Israel aims to permanently prevent Iran from acquiring such capabilities or others perceived as existential threats; the U.S. oscillates between containment, nonproliferation, and regional withdrawal, depending on each administration.

As a result, even when temporary truces or agreements arise—such as the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal or the U.S./Qatar-brokered June 2025 ceasefire—these resemble circumstantial planetary alignments rather than lasting structures. These configurations drift, deteriorate, or collapse under the pressure of conflicting national interests or external shocks.

The three-body problem is defined by its acute sensitivity to initial conditions: a minor change in trajectory or velocity can alter the entire evolution of the system. In geopolitical terms, minor incidents—a drone attack in Syria, a cyberattack in Natanz, the elimination of a key figure, or an announcement at the UN—can provoke disproportionate responses.

The assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani by the U.S. in 2020 and the Israeli sabotage of Iranian centrifuges in 2022 were not isolated events; they were triggers in a system already on the brink of escalation. Similarly, Israel’s attack on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 12, 2025, provoked a barrage of Iranian missiles and the direct military involvement of the U.S. on June 21, followed by Iranian retaliation in Qatar on June 23—all occurring within just 12 days. Predictability gives way to volatility, and what begins as a tactical posture quickly becomes a strategic confrontation.

Key Timeline of Escalation

Date	Key Event
June 13–15	Israel launches major offensive against Iranian nuclear facilities; Iran responds with missiles/drones.
June 22	U.S. strikes Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan nuclear sites (Operation Midnight Hammer).
June 23	Iran attacks U.S. base in Qatar; most missiles intercepted by Qatar and the U.S.
June 24	Ceasefire established after 12 days of military escalation.

Energy Transfers, Temporary Alignments, and External Disturbances

In orbital mechanics, celestial bodies can exchange momentum during close encounters—gravitational assists that alter their trajectories. Similarly, the Iran–Israel–U.S. triangle is not only defined by direct interactions but also by proxy actors and regional alignments that redistribute power and risk.

Iran relies on partnerships with Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shia militias in Iraq and Syria to expand its influence and impose costs. Israel, in turn, benefits from normalization agreements with GCC states and U.S. political support to bolster its position. The U.S. exerts influence through military presence, economic sanctions, and diplomatic coalitions, indirectly affecting the Iran–Israel dynamic. These exchanges generate feedback loops that distort trajectories and obscure intentions.

Each actor sees the status quo as unacceptable. Iran believes its sovereignty and security require nuclear deterrence or at least strategic ambiguity. Israel sees this as an existential threat requiring preventive action. The U.S. seeks to avoid being drawn into another Middle East conflict while trying to regain credibility, protect allies, and prevent nuclear proliferation. These interests are structurally misaligned. No deterrence or diplomatic effort has resolved the basic asymmetry in threat perceptions. This irreconcilability fuels recurring crises: the nuclear file is just one of several gravitational forces—along with regional influence, ideological rivalry, and proxy warfare—that ensure constant movement without convergence.

Occasionally, the three actors reach moments of tacit coordination. The JCPOA was one such alignment, with a U.S.–Iran détente that momentarily eased Israeli fears. The June 2025 ceasefire, mediated by the U.S. after bombing Iranian targets, represents another precarious equilibrium. But these configurations are inherently unstable. They depend on political leadership, external context, and favorable timing.

Trump’s personal intervention to stop escalation in 2025 may have worked temporarily, but similar efforts have failed in the past—or were dismantled by successor governments, including Trump himself in 2018. These alignments lack the gravitational cohesion needed to endure, especially when disrupted by elections, assassinations, targeted strikes, or symbolic provocations.

As in astrophysics, the three-body system does not exist in a vacuum. Other actors—China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and even non-state groups like Hamas or ISIS—act as external forces that can destabilize the system. China’s interest in Gulf energy, Russia’s role in Syria, and Qatar’s mediation in U.S.–Iran talks introduce new variables into the equation.

Moreover, changes in the international order—from the erosion of U.S. unilateralism to the rise of BRICS diplomacy—alter each actor’s mass and drag, affecting their trajectories. The Iran–Israel–U.S. triangle cannot be understood in isolation; it is embedded in a broader system of competing gravitational influences.

Conclusion: Toward a Dynamic Equilibrium?

In astronomy, some three-body systems reach a temporary quasi-stability—not through resolution, but via dynamic equilibrium, where constant motion is managed within a limited space. A similar vision may be the best possible outcome for Iran, Israel, and the United States. Instead of seeking permanent peace—unlikely given structural antagonism—regional and global actors could aim to establish thresholds, red lines, and crisis-management protocols that keep escalation within defined parameters. The 2025 ceasefire, if expanded into a regular indirect dialogue framework and strategic disconnection, could serve as the foundation for such a bounded system.

But as in the astrophysical analogy, this will require constant recalibration, vigilance, and the recognition that equilibrium does not mean immobility—it means surviving within movement.

The three-body problem, both in space and in geopolitics, is a study in the limits of prediction and the inevitability of instability. Iran, Israel, and the United States form a gravitational triad whose orbits are shaped by irreconcilable goals, external pressures, and mutual distrust.

Managing this system is not solving it, but navigating it—recognizing its chaotic nature, anticipating its crises, and building mechanisms capable of withstanding its turbulence. The laws of politics may not be as fixed as Newton’s, but they are no less prone to spirals, collisions, and the long drag of unintended consequences.

Therefore, predicting or foreseeing future developments in the behavior of these three bodies remains highly challenging—especially in light of recent events and the increasing personalization of foreign policy decision-making. While Iran has long been portrayed as the more unpredictable or ideologically driven actor, it is Israel and the United States—under increasingly personalistic leaderships such as Netanyahu and Trump—whose decision-making processes now introduce greater volatility. Paradoxically, Iran has become the most structurally consistent and predictable of the triad.

^[1] For non-physics experts, some suggested readings to understand the “Three-body problem”: Skyler Ware, “What is the 3-body problem, and is it really unsolvable?”, LiveScience, 2024 (https://www.livescience.com/physics-mathematics/what-is-the-3-body-problem-and-is-it-really-unsolvable); Richard Montgomery, “The Three-Body Problem”, Scientific American, 2019 (https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-three-body-problem/); and Cody Mello-Klei, “What is the ‘3 Body Problem’? Astrophysicist explains concept behind hit Netflix show”, NorthEastern Global News, 2024 (https://news.northeastern.edu/2024/03/26/3-body-problem-netflix/).