The Middle East is not a Problem to be Solved

Dr. Khalid Al-Khater

President, New Ground Research

The middle east is not a problem to be solved - Dr. Khalid Al-Khater.pdf

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Abstract

Persistent instability in the Middle East is frequently regarded as an inherent characteristic of the region. The ongoing war between the US/Israel and Iran further reinforces this perception. In reality, persistent instability is largely a consequence of how the region is framed, managed and repeatedly organised by both external and internal actors. This article contends that treating the Middle East as a perpetual crisis — something to be pacified, stabilised, or solved instead of genuinely understood — creates a cycle of short-term “fixes” and, therefore, enduring disorder. It challenges a governing habit of thought: the depiction of the region as exceptional and essentially chaotic, and the reflexive crisis-management responses and policy “pastiche” that follow. The purpose here is not to offer an all-encompassing theory of the Middle East, but to unsettle one durable assumption that has haunted the region since before the Second World War: that it exists primarily as a problem to be solved.

ملخص المقال باللغة العربية

غالباً ما يُنظر إلى حالة عدم الاستقرار في الشرق الأوسط بوصفها سمةً متأصلةً في المنطقة، وهو تصورٌ تكرّسه المواجهة المستمرة بين الولايات المتحدة وإسرائيل من جهة، وإيران من جهة أخرى. بيد أن هذا الاضطراب المزمن ليس في جوهره إلا نتاجاً لكيفية تأطير المنطقة وإدارتها وإعادة تنظيمها المستمر من قِبل القوى الخارجية والداخلية على حد سواء.

تجادل هذه المقالة بأن التعاطي مع الشرق الأوسط بوصفه "أزمة دائمة" تتطلب التهدئة أو "الاستقرار" أو الحل بدلاً من السعي نحو فهم حقيقي لأزماته يؤدي بالضرورة إلى دوامة من الحلول المؤقتة وفوضى هيكلية مستمرة. كما تتحدى "العادة الفكرية" السائدة التي تصوّر المنطقة كحالة استثنائية وفضاء فوضوي بطبيعته، وما يترتب على ذلك من سياسات تكتفي بإدارة الأزمات وحلول "ترقيعية" تفتقر إلى التخطيط المتماسك.

لا يهدف هذا المقال إلى تقديم نظرية شاملة عن الشرق الأوسط، بل يسعى إلى زعزعة افتراض راسخ يهيمن على المنطقة منذ ما قبل الحرب العالمية الثانية: وهو أن الشرق الأوسط وُجد، في المقام الأول، ليكون "مشكلة" تنتظر "الحل".

Resumen:

La inestabilidad persistente en Medio Oriente suele considerarse una característica inherente de la región. La guerra en curso entre Estados Unidos/Israel e Irán refuerza aún más esa percepción. En realidad, la inestabilidad persistente es, en gran medida, consecuencia de cómo la región es enmarcada, gestionada y reorganizada repetidamente tanto por actores externos como internos. Este artículo sostiene que tratar Medio Oriente como una crisis permanente, algo que debe ser pacificado, estabilizado o resuelto, en lugar de ser comprendido de manera genuina, genera un ciclo de “soluciones” de corto plazo y, por tanto, de desorden duradero. Cuestiona un hábito de pensamiento en la gobernanza de la región: su representación como un espacio excepcional y esencialmente caótico, así como las respuestas reflejas de gestión de crisis y el pastiche de políticas que de ello se derivan. El propósito aquí no es ofrecer una teoría omnicomprensiva de Medio Oriente, sino poner en cuestión un supuesto persistente que ha perseguido a la región desde antes de la Segunda Guerra Mundial: que existe, ante todo, como un problema que debe resolverse.

The Middle East is not a Problem to be Solved

The Gulf states and the wider Middle East are experiencing an ensuing critical escalation. To those who frame the region as naturally prone to violence and instability (as though this were some pathology embedded in its very fabric), the unraveling since the US/Israel attacks on Iran and the drawing in of Gulf states into the line of fire by Iran, confirms a familiar story: another fault line ruptures, another domino falls into place in a sequence assumed to be both natural and endless.

Does this fatalism hold under scrutiny? The short answer is no, but the question deserves more than a cursory dismissal. To reject it properly, we have to confront the postcolonial and orientalist assumptions that often structure it. But it is also important to avoid the trap of blaming external actors alone for “problematising” the Middle East, as this framing is also leveraged by some regional actors to advance their foreign policies and to ensure domestic legitimacy. For example, during the 2011 Arab Uprisings, overthrown authoritarian leaders across the Middle East consistently portrayed the region as a "problem to be solved." They urged protestors to view them as protectors against instability, using this narrative to justify their hold on power.

The “Middle East as a problem to solve” launchpad is not politically innocent. The view of the Middle East as a standing emergency does not simply misdescribe the region; it also licenses a certain kind of interventionist and managerial politics. The region becomes something to handle, contain and periodically reset — the frequency at which our region is updated to another “New Middle East” since the turn of the 20th century has accelerated significantly over the past 20-odd years.

The Trap of the Reflexive Crisis Response

This problem-to-be-solved framing is a mindset that begins with the crisis (problem), therefore, can only produce reflexive responses calibrated to the immediate and near future. The issue is not simply that these responses are insufficient; it is that they are structured to arrive too late, leave too much untouched and, more relevant to the current context, it does not allow space for diplomacy to reel back escalation.

At one end of reflexive problem-solving, dominant approaches to regional issues often immediately dive into de-escalation protocols involving rigorous diplomacy that end in fragile containment; at the other end, extreme measures are implemented to bury the problem (often literally), which very often do inadvertently create a cluster bomb of new issues to mitigate.

Ironically, what is urgently needed are slower-paced frameworks and imaginative solutions that prioritise confidence-building — moving beyond congregating at the drawing board, emergency rooms and summits at the onset of pivotal events (the outcomes of unresolved causes). This might look like sustained, low-visibility diplomatic channels that operate independently of crisis timelines, the kind of architecture that exists not to manage a war but to make the next one not so inevitable.      The current Israel/US-Iran war and its spillover effects are being examined in situation rooms and beyond, overwhelmingly, through cold geopolitical and economic calculations. The focus on the day-by-day unravellings rightly centres on the very real, tangible, and urgent threats faced by Gulf states, the wider region, and the world. This focus is not wrong — it is necessary — but it is missing an equally vital component: working backwards.

The current predicament the Gulf finds itself in is forced upon it and unprecedented — reminiscent of the uncertainty that prevailed during the invasion of Kuwait. Still, with this in mind, a broader approach that encompasses more intentional, slow-paced ways to address escalation and conflict across the wider region is long overdue.

Beyond our current predicament, and as we have observed over the past almost 30 years, problems are rarely contained or “solved” through reflexive protocols and so-called decisive measures. Whatever one’s view of the JCPOA’s original merit, for example, its dismantling in pursuit of a “better deal” did not produce one. Instead, it contributed to the resumption of independent uranium enrichment by Iran, intensified regional proxies, and attacks on energy infrastructure — conditions that have directly fed into the current escalation.

In today’s context, analysts are wondering why Gulf states are not responding to threats and attacks on their sovereignty and energy infrastructure with reflexive, decisive measures — my hope is that the aforementioned clarifies the collective Gulf posture.  They operate under a fundamentally different calculus. because they understand, from memory, that complex disruptive forces are not successfully addressed by decisive measures and reflexive problem-solving. They relocate, mutate and return.

Beyond Lost Futures and ‘Pastiche’ in Middle East Crisis Response

In his cultural critique, Mark Fisher used the concept of ‘Pastiche’ to describe a society that no longer invents, but rearranges inherited forms of what has already been, an echo of lost futures. Nowhere is this more apparent — or more consequential— than in the ways the Middle East is framed and approached.

When it comes to decisive measures, consider the Israeli targeting of Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure: rather than deterring Saddam Hussein, it arguably emboldened him. Moreover, his eventual downfall through regime change—justified by accusations of weapons of mass destruction—failed to create a stable future for Iraq or the region. The ongoing attacks on Iran and their stated objectives overlook the lessons from this history.  Moreover, Iran is a case in its own right; recycled approaches across different contexts in this vast region carry dangerous reverberations.

When it comes to policy frameworks, old roadmaps, old security formulas, and ritual invocations of deterrence are revived under updated conditions. The language changes — stabilisation, security reform, democratic transition, strategic reset, a “New Middle East” — but the governing impulse remains remarkably constant (The Middle East as a problem to be solved). Each time, these approaches are presented as solutions, as if the mere act of reassembly or repetition could conjure genuine novelty, progress or “wins”. These are exercises in what Fisher called “business ontology” — the world as a set of closed options, endlessly rearranged but fundamentally unchanged.

A Note on the Politics of Dates

Reflexive problem-solving always relies on a convenient start date. History is made to begin (again) at the floodgates of each event — 1967, 1979, 2001, October 7, 2023, or the 28th of February this year. These dates are not neutral markers; they are political instruments used to simplify the story, shorten the field of vision, and compress complex histories into a manageable crisis narrative. Insisting that history begins at the “start” of crises excludes a multiplicity of mediating, de-escalatory, and real-rapprochement opportunities — particularly because they work to erase the complex web of causes and consequences that precede them.

Only by acknowledging the full arc of events, and resisting the temptation to weaponise dates for rhetorical effect, can a more honest and effective conversation about the Middle East’s challenges — and their possible solutions — begin.

A Final Note

As stated above, the purpose here is not to offer an all-encompassing theory of the Middle East or robust solutions.  But, if anything is to change, the region must be approached with greater patience and creativity, and a profound modesty about the explanatory power of “pastiche” frameworks. The region’s problems are not unsolvable. But they will remain so as long as the frameworks applied to them treat intractability as a feature of the landscape rather than a product of the approach.