Stranded in the Middle: Iraq Amid the US – Israel war on Iran

Abdulla Al-Khazraji

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Stranded in the Middle Iraq Amid the US – Israel war on Iran - Abdulla Al-Khazraji.pdf

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English Abstract

            From the US – Israeli war on Iran arises the peculiar case of Iraq. Although it has not officially entered the war, Iraq has been targeted by both sides. Already facing a political deadlock exemplified by the crisis over government formation, Baghdad is confronted with the seemingly unachievable task of maintaining Iraq’s neutrality during this war. The current escalation has already cast its shadow over Iraqi political dynamics, further complicating Nouri al-Maliki’s ongoing bid for the premiership and strangling the country’s oil-dependent economy. From these dynamics emerges the role of Iran-aligned armed factions in Iraq. The position of the armed groups vis-à-vis the escalation has been diverse. While most opted to simply voice support to Iran via statements, a few have actively engaged in the war by launching attacks on US assets, regional countries, and internal targets in Iraq. All in all, the government in Baghdad is at a crossroads where it must decide on how to engage with Iran-aligned armed factions. The article concludes that the inherent contradictions within Iraq’s political environment have led to a foreign policy that is reactive instead of proactive, often placing Iraq at odds with Gulf Arab states and endangering overall regional stability. Ultimately, the people of Iraq and their aspirations of a stable state of law appears to be the biggest losers from the current status quo.

ملخص المقال باللغة العربية

            من الحرب الأمريكية – الإسرائيلية على إيران تتجلى الحالة الاستثنائية للعراق. على الرغم من أنه لم يدخل الحرب بشكل رسمي، إلا أن العراق تم استهدافه من طرفي الحرب. تواجه بغداد، التي تعاني بالفعل من مأزق سياسي يتجلى في أزمة تشكيل الحكومة، مهمة تبدو مستحيلة تتمثل في الحفاظ على حياد العراق خلال هذه الحرب. وقد ألقى بالفعل التصعيد الأخير ظلاله على الديناميات السياسية العراقية مما زاد من تعقيد مساعي نوري المالكي المستمرة للوصول إلى رئاسة الوزراء، فضلًا عن خنق اقتصاد البلاد المعتمد على النفط. من هذه الديناميات يبرز دور الفصائل المسلحة المرتبطة بإيران. كان موقف الجماعات المسلحة من التصعيد متنوعًا، فبينما اكتفى معظمهم بمجرد التعبير عن دعم إيران ببيانات، انخرط عدد قليل منهم بنشاط في الحرب من خلال شن هجمات على أصول أمريكية، دول إقليمية، وأهداف داخلية عراقية. بشكل عام، تتواجد الحكومة في بغداد على مفترق طرق يجبرها على البت في سبل تعاملها مع الفصائل المسلحة المرتبطة بإيران. ويخلص المقال إلى أن التناقضات الداخلية في البيئة السياسية للعراق أدت إلى سياسة خارجية تتسم برد الفعل بدلًا من الفعل الاستباقي، مما يضع العراق في كثير من الأحيان في مواجهة مع دول الخليج العربية، ويعرض الاستقرار الإقليمي بشكل عام للخطر. وفي نهاية المطاف، يتضح أن شعب العراق وطموحاته بدولة القانون المستقرة هو الخاسر الأكبر في ظل الوضع القائم.

Resúmen en español

De la guerra de EEUU e Israel contra Irán surge el caso peculiar de Iraq. Aunque no ha entrado oficialmente en la guerra, Iraq ha sido atacado por ambas partes. Ya enfrentado a un bloqueo político, ejemplificado por la crisis en la formación del gobierno, Bagdad se ve ante la tarea, aparentemente inalcanzable, de mantener la neutralidad del país durante esta guerra. La actual escalada ya ha proyectado su sombra sobre la dinámica política iraquí, complicando aún más la actual apuesta de Nouri al-Maliki por volver al cargo de primer ministro, además de estrangular la economía del país, dependiente del petróleo. De estas dinámicas emerge el papel de las facciones armadas iraquíes alineadas con Irán. La posición de estos grupos armados frente a la escalada ha sido diversa. Mientras la mayoría optó simplemente por expresar su apoyo a Irán mediante comunicados, algunos han participado activamente en la guerra lanzando ataques contra activos estadounidenses, países de la región y objetivos internos en Iraq. En conjunto, el gobierno de Bagdad se encuentra en una encrucijada, en la que debe decidir cómo relacionarse con las milicias armadas. El artículo concluye que las contradicciones inherentes al entorno político iraquí han dado lugar a una política exterior reactiva en lugar de proactiva, colocando con frecuencia a Iraq en desacuerdo con los Estados árabes del Golfo y poniendo en peligro la estabilidad regional en su conjunto. En última instancia, el pueblo iraquí y sus aspiraciones de contar con un Estado de derecho estable parecen ser los grandes perdedores del actual statu quo.

Introduction

            The ongoing and escalating conflict in West Asia quickly signals a broader regional war. However, amidst the airstrikes on Tehran and Tel Aviv, an important perspective emerges through Iraq. From the US–Israeli actions against Iran and Iran’s targeting of Israel, to US interests and civilian infrastructure in the Arab Gulf states, Iraq presents a unique case. It is the only country targeted by both sides of the conflict while not being an official belligerent. Already grappling with internal political deadlock amid a protracted government formation process, Baghdad’s political elites face the seemingly impossible task of maintaining Iraq’s neutrality during this war. This involves sustaining good relations with both the US and Iran, convincing the US to restrain itself and Israel from targeting Iraqi actors, and preventing Iran-backed armed factions in Iraq from dragging the country into a confrontation with the US and the GCC.

This article aims to provide an understanding of Iraqi internal political dynamics as the US – Israel war on Iran progresses, exploring the conflict’s implications on the calculus of the government formation process, as well as the financial toll of the confrontation on Iraq’s economy. Furthermore, the article is centred on the role that Iraqi Iran-backed armed factions play by examining their capabilities, willingness to participate, level of engagement in the conflict, and how the interplay of these dynamics can affect the system’s stability and sustainability.

Impact on Internal Political Dynamics

            The regional escalation has further exacerbated Iraq’s ongoing government formation crisis[1]. As of writing this article (mid-March) political forces have already exceeded the designated constitutional limits to elect a new president of the republic by more than a month. Moreover, the recent regional confrontation has only sharpened contradictions within internal dynamics adding an additional angle to Nouri al-Maliki’s candidacy for a third term as a prime minister. With the war between the US and Israel on one side and Iran on the other raging on, Iraq’s government formation crisis becomes another theater of confrontation. With reports emerging, claiming that with the election Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, the new leadership in Iran has chosen to support al-Maliki and apply pressure on Iraqi actors to confirm him, as a new challenging act to the US.

The impact of the war on the process of forming a new government can also be observed through the renewed insistence of Iran-aligned armed factions on having a say in the process. Kata’ib Hezbollah’s Abu Ali al-Askari has stated in a post that: “the approval of the next prime minister will not take place without the approval of the Islamic Resistance… [and that the decision] will be made without the dictates of the evil American administration.” On the other hand, al-Maliki’s return is still facing opposition related to political and legal balances. Notably, the head of the Supreme Judiciary Council, Faiq Zaidan, has recently published an article calling for amending article 76 of the constitution in order to codify the notion that the list that has won the most seats in the elections constitutes the largest bloc which possesses the right to form the next government. Under this suggestion, current prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Alliance would possess that right.

Economically, Iraq is set to be profoundly affected by the ongoing war in the region. The country is losing millions of dollars in oil revenue daily due to Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, Iraqi energy interests have been targeted, as fuel tankers carrying Iraqi oil shipments were attacked by explosive Iranian boats within Iraqi territorial waters. One sailor was killed in the attack, and 38 others were rescued by Iraqi authorities. Already suffering from widespread corruption and a bloated public sector, the loss of oil revenues could prove catastrophic for Iraq. Consequently, Iraq’s oil minister has announced that the ministry is developing a pipeline capable of transporting between 250 and 450,000 barrels per day from Kirkuk in the north to Turkey’s Ceyhan port. The minister also mentioned that they are in contact with Iran to negotiate a solution that would allow Iraqi oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz to resume.

From this turbulent regional situation, Baghdad finds itself in a difficult position where it must make a decision. The government's official stance was outlined in a statement by Prime Minister al-Sudani. He expressed rejection of any attempts to draw Iraq into the conflict or to use Iraq’s territories or airspace to threaten its neighbours, emphasising that only the state has the right to decide on war and peace. However, questions remain about the government’s ability to enforce this stance against both regional and global actors, as well as domestic Iran-aligned armed factions. Reports indicate that US and Israeli refuelling aircraft supporting operations in Iran have flown over Iraqi airspace. Meanwhile, Iran has launched missile and drone attacks on Iraq, targeting US assets in Erbil, northern Iraq. Lastly, Baghdad appears to lack genuine control over Iraqi armed groups backed by Iran, which have also carried out attacks on the US embassy in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).

Iran-Aligned Armed Factions

           The position of the “axis of resistance” in Iraq, as exemplified by Iran-aligned armed factions regarding the US–Israeli war on Iran, has varied. Some have remained silent, most have issued statements of solidarity with Iran, and others, through their operations, have de facto entered the confrontation. It is important to note that the exact number of Iraqi armed groups launching attacks in support of Iran remains unclear due to the deliberate use of the general name “Islamic Resistance of Iraq” to obscure the specific faction responsible. This name, as well as others, is used by a limited number of “hardline” Iran-aligned groups, namely Kata’ib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba’, Kata’ib Sayed al-Shuhada’, and Ansar Allah al-Awfiya’. 

Armed groups in Iraq possess ballistic missile and drone capabilities that have been used in the current war against US and regional targets. However, Iraqi security and intelligence officers have also claimed that the weaponry of these groups have decreased both in quality and quantity as Iran has reduced its shipments to them. Another facet that should be taken into consideration when examining the activities of Iran-aligned factions is their willingness to participate in a full-scale regional war. Some of these factions such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq and Badr Organization have established complicated economic networks that have made them “too fat to fight” in such an unrestricted confrontation.

With that in mind, Iran-aligned armed groups did under the name of the “Islamic Resistance of Iraq” launch several attacks on a plethora of targets. From the start of the war -and as of March 19, through multiple statements, the “resistance” have claimed to have launched a total of 415 operations against “the bases of the occupation in Iraq and in the region” using missiles and drones as well as hitting two KC-135 US refueling aircrafts flying over Iraq. A US logistics center near Baghdad International Airport was also attacked by seven drones. Additionally, Kata’ib Hezbollah released footage of an FPV drone flying through US camp victory in the capital before exploding. Furthermore, non-American foreign presence in Iraq was also targeted. For instance, K1 base in Kirkuk which hosts Iraqi and International Coalition forces was attacked. While in the KRI, Italian and French forces were attacked which resulted in the death of a French soldier. Furthermore, US diplomatic and consular missions in Iraq were not spared from targeting as the US embassy in Baghdad and its consulate in Erbil were both targeted by repetitive drone attacks. Iran-aligned armed factions have also attacked regional states such as Kuwait and Jordan.

Armed factions have also made domestic targets and civilian infrastructure a target. Iraqi oil fields and facilities were attacked under the justification of harming US interests as they were managed and operated by US companies. Majnoon oil field in Basra was subjected to drone attacks in an assault targeting the office of the US company KBR. Also in Basra, Rumaila oil field was targeted, the country’s largest oil field was operated by the British company BP. Similarly, in the KRI, several oil and gas facilities were targeted. Operations were stopped following attacks on HKN oil field and Lanaz oil refinery in Duhok and Erbil, respectively. Resulting of fear of being targeted, some energy fields have opted to halt operations such as Khor Mor natural gas field in Sulaymaniyah.

The aforementioned strikes on its interests did not go unnoticed by the US. In response, locations and camps of armed factions operating under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) were attacked on multiple occasions. In attacks carried out by the US – and possibly Israel, forces of several PMF brigades were targeted in airstrikes. The 33rd and 40th brigades operating in Mosul; the 19th brigade belonging to Ansar Allah al-Awfiya’ operating in Anbar, west of Iraq; the 16th brigade belonging to Badr Organisation operating in southern Kirkuk; the 47th brigade belonging to Kata’ib Hezbollah operating in Babylon; the 45th brigade belonging to Kata’ib Hezbollah operating in Anbar; and the 30th brigade operating in Mosul were all targeted since the beginning of the escalation. Although exact numbers of losses are unclear, the PMF has announced that up until 12 March, attacks on its forces resulted in 27 killed and 50 injured. Through examining different reports and PMF announcements up until 19 March, the number of losses increases to between 37 killed and 56 injured, and 160 killed and injured.

In addition to airstrikes, the US have also adopted a policy of targeted assassinations in handling Iran-aligned armed factions in Iraq. Recently multiple high ranking militia figures were targeted in residential areas. On March 14, an airstrike assassinated multiple high ranking Kata’ib Hezbollah officials, including Abu Ali al-Askari, the group’s “security official” and spokesperson. Additionally, an airstrike on a house close to the highly fortified governmental Green Zone has also killed eight individuals on March 16. Not much else is revealed of the identities of the targeted individuals, but it is indicated that they were high ranking officials in the armed factions as well as two Iranian Revolutionary Guard advisors. Following this recent escalation in the capital, Kata’ib Hezbollah announced on March 19, a five-day ceasefire in Baghdad. The armed faction stated that halting its attacks on the US embassy is contingent – among other things – on the US preventing Israel from attacking Beirut’s Dahieh and abstaining from targeting residential areas in Baghdad and Iraq’s provinces. In conjunction with this declaration, the NATO mission in Iraq announced it is “adjusting” its presence in Iraq, as reports have claimed their withdrawal from the country.

Conclusion

            For years, Iraq has experienced a dichotomy between state institutions and armed factions operating outside of state control. The US-Israeli conflict with Iran has further exposed this duality within the state and has imposed on the Iraqi government the seemingly impossible task of balancing these opposing forces. While claiming to maintain Iraq’s nominal neutrality and avoid involvement in the conflict, the reality is different. Iraqi airspace is being utilised by the US and Israel to conduct attacks on Iran. Iran, in turn, targets US interests and Iranian-Kurdish opposition groups within Iraq. Among the many Iraqi Iran-aligned armed groups, a significant number are actively supporting Iran, targeting not only US presence but also vital Iraqi assets.

The escalating confrontation has shed light on an inherent contradiction within Iraq’s system. As long as armed groups remain outside of state-control, Iraq’s political system continues to be unstable, unpredictable, and unsustainable. The war, in conjunction with the actions of the aforementioned factions are not only threatening the country’s security but its regional integration efforts as well. As the government in Baghdad is preaching neutrality, armed factions are actively participating in the war. This dichotomy can lead to different ends, most of them non-peaceful. Some lead to the dismantling of militias through a confrontation with Iraqi armed forces. A measure with the potential to devolve into a civil war. Another scenario could also lead to a more pronounced US intervention aimed at diminishing the factions’ capacity to pose a threat to US interests. On the other hand, the interplay of the abovementioned dynamics can lead to further entrenchment of Iran-aligned armed factions within state institutions, resulting in a further weakened government.

Overall, this situation places the government in Baghdad at a crossroads with Iran-aligned armed factions. Currently, Iraqi foreign policy appears to be reactive rather than proactive. It seems focused on damage control rather than negotiation and is hampered in engaging freely in regional politics because it is beholden to armed factions outside the control of the state. The greatest victims of these circumstances are the Iraqi people, whose aspirations for a democratic rule of law are seemingly impossible to achieve under the present status quo.  

[1] For a deeper examination of Iraq’s government formation process, see Iraq’s Government Formation Process: Familiar Faces, External Pressure, and Uncertainty

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