Iraq’s Government Formation Process: Familiar Faces, External Pressure, and Uncertainty

Abdulla Al-Khazraji

Guest Contributor

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Abstract

Following Iraq’s sixth Parliamentary elections, the country’s political actors seem to be entering another government formation crisis. From the confusion, arises the controversial nomination of Nouri al-Maliki for Prime Minister. This article attempts to provide an understanding of the variables surrounding al-Maliki’s resurgence, shedding light on the aftermath of the elections, present a reading of the internal dynamics of the government formation process, and examine the possible impact al-Maliki’s third term could have on Iraq’s foreign relations, mainly with the US, Iran, and the GCC. The article argues that the currently unfolding situation reveals further entrenchment of Iraq’s ethno-sectarian consociationalism in conjunction with a drift away from democratic practice.

بعد دورة الانتخابات البرلمانية السادسة في العراق، يبدو أن الفاعلين السياسيين يدخلون أزمة تشكيل حكومة جديدة. ومن عمق الارتباك، يظهر ترشيح نوري المالكي لرئاسة الوزراء. يحاول هذا المقال توفير فهم للمتغيرات المحيطة بعودة المالكي المحتملة، وتسليط الضوء على تداعيات الانتخابات البرلمانية، وتقديم قراءة في الديناميكيات الداخلية لعملية تشكيل الحكومة، ودراسة التأثير المحتمل لولاية المالكي الثالثة على علاقات العراق الخارجية، على وجه الخصوص مع الولايات المتحدة، وإيران، ومجلس التعاون الخليجي. ويجادل المقال بأن الوضع الراهن يكشف عن مزيد من الترسخ لنظام المحاصصة الطائفية والإثنية في العراق بالتزامن مع الابتعاد عن الممارسة الديمقراطية.

Resumen

Tras las sextas elecciones parlamentarias de Iraq, los actores políticos del país parecen estar entrando en otra crisis de formación de gobierno. En medio de la confusión, surge la controvertida nominación de Nouri al-Maliki como primer ministro. Este artículo busca ofrecer una comprensión de las variables que rodean el resurgimiento de al-Maliki, arrojando luz sobre las secuelas de las elecciones, proponiendo una lectura de las dinámicas internas del proceso de formación de gobierno y examinando el posible impacto que un tercer mandato de al-Maliki podría tener sobre las relaciones exteriores de Iraq, principalmente con Estados Unidos, Irán y el Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo (CCG). El artículo sostiene que la situación actualmente en desarrollo revela un mayor afianzamiento del consociacionalismo etnosectario iraquí, junto con un alejamiento de la práctica democrática.

Introduction

            Nearly three months have passed since Iraq’s sixth Parliamentary elections in November 2025, and the country’s political elites seem to be entering yet another government formation crisis. Even though seat allocation was finalised through the constitutional court’s ratification of the results, the features of the next government remain unclear. The interplay of internal and external dynamics further complicates the process. From this predicament arises the controversial nomination of Nouri al-Maliki. Al-Maliki, who has previously served two terms as Prime Minister (2006-14) has been named as the Coordination Framework’s candidate to serve a third term. The possibility of his return garnered domestic and foreign opposition, bringing to mind the events during his previous terms, which concluded with ISIS taking control of approximately a third of the country. That said, the core problem is not necessarily reflected in the possible return of al-Maliki. Rather, the currently unfolding situation highlights the inherent shortcomings of Iraq’s post-2003 muhasasa, the informal ethno-sectarian consociationalism attached to the country’s quasi-democratic system.

            This article does not attempt to predict the identity of the upcoming government. However, it attempts to provide an understanding of the variables surrounding al-Maliki’s resurgence, the domestic aspects of the government formation process, and the possible impact al-Maliki’s third term could have on Iraq’s foreign relations, mainly with the US, Iran, and the GCC. Therefore, the remainder of the article is divided into three parts: the aftermath of the Parliamentary elections, internal dynamics, and the impact on relations with the US, Iran, and the GCC.

The Aftermath of the Parliamentary Elections:

            Following the elections, the Supreme Judicial Council issued a reminder to political forces of the constitutionally defined limits[1] to form a new government. According to the constitution, a new government should be formed through a sequence of steps within 90 days from the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the final results of the elections, which took place on 14 December. As of writing this article (early February), the newly elected Council of Representatives (CoR) succeeded in electing a speaker to the Parliament within the designated limits. Haibat al-Halbousi, a cousin of former speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi and a member of his party, taqqadum, was elected as the new head of the legislative body. However, the council still has not elected a president, in a clear violation of constitutional limits[2]. This delay is attributed to differences between the two major Kurdish parties[3].

            After al-Halbousi was elected as the new speaker of the CoR, the Coordination Framework (CF) officially presented itself as the largest bloc in parliament, with nearly 175 seats. Explaining that it was the coalition’s right to nominate the next Prime Minister. Initially, the current Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, was nominated for a second term by his Reconstruction and Development Alliance, which was the single largest coalition with 46 seats. However, following some objections to al-Sudani getting a second term from within the CF, and through a series of meetings, Prime Minister al-Sudani withdrew his nomination in favour of supporting the nomination of Nouri al-Maliki.

            The chances of al-Maliki’s third term were further complicated by an explicit US opposition. A post by US President Donald Trump directly addressed the nomination of al-Maliki, stating that: “[another term of al-Maliki] should not be allowed to happen again.” And that if al-Maliki is reelected: “the United States of America will no longer help Iraq.” This position undoubtedly raised the stakes of al-Maliki’s return. The CF can either withdraw its support for al-Maliki, exacerbating existing animosities within the coalition and appearing weak in the eyes of its supporters, or commit to its candidate and risk US sanctions.

Internal Dynamics:

            Al-Maliki’s nomination should not be seen as a singular extraordinary event, it must be understood within the context of Iraqi politics, primarily through internal dynamics within the CF. In this regard, two things should be clarified about the CF. First, it is not necessarily internally unified. While the coalition successfully maintained its structure throughout the tumultuous period leading up to the parliamentary elections, its members are not always on the same page. The coalition was established in 2021 to organise Shia forces that were opposed to the Sadrists and -to varying degrees- aligned with Iran. Today, with the Sadrists withdrawn from politics for almost five years, and Iran’s regional position weakened, the CF is hardly a united front. Second, while the coalition did collectively win close to 175 seats out of 329 in the CoR, it still cannot operate independently of other political actors. Even in the case that all the CF’s members were in agreement, they still cannot afford to alienate other forces, as the threshold required for the election of the Presidency or to vote in the new government is more than two-thirds of MPs. Therefore, the coalition’s opponents could still paralyse the parliament indefinitely if the CF does not accommodate them. A strategy previously employed by the CF following the 2021 elections against the Sadrists.

Hence, the resurgence of al-Maliki for a possible third term should be viewed as the result of internal balances among different forces, an attempt to take advantage of an opportune moment, and multiple factors coming together. Mainly, the CF’s monopoly over the Shia share of power, as well as the coalition’s initial internal opposition to al-Sudani’s ambition of securing a second term. In addition, it could be argued that the current regional situation, exemplified by a weakened Iran, an emboldened Israel with seemingly unwavering US support, and an unfavourable government in Syria have led the CF to the conclusion that a strong government is required to safeguard the benefits and gains of Iran-aligned Shia groups. It could be seen as direct Iranian involvement to entrench its allies in Iraq’s upcoming government in an attempt to protect its influence in the country. It is under these conditions that the nomination of al-Maliki came to be.

Alternatively, al-Maliki's nomination can also be seen as a political manoeuvre by al-Sudani. This line of reasoning argues that al-Maliki, a controversial figure opposed by several domestic, regional, and international powers, was the reason al-Sudani supported his nomination. As this would put al-Maliki in a high-stakes confrontation that would eventually exhaust his chances, as evident in Trump’s post. Domestically, al-Maliki’s nomination triggered objections from several forces. For instance, former speaker of the Parliament, Mohammed al-Halbousi, publicly opposed al-Maliki on multiple occasions.

 The head of taqaddum party, which secured 27 seats in the elections, cited past catastrophes such as losing a third of the country to ISIS under the rule of al-Maliki and possible future crises related to Iraq’s foreign relations and economy. Even within the CF, al-Maliki’s nomination ruffled some feathers. Parties such as the National Wisdom Movement, led by cleric Ammar al-Hakim, and the Victory Alliance, led by former Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, both opposed the nomination. As of writing this article, al-Maliki has refused to withdraw his nomination, while also giving the CF the authority to nominate a different candidate.

Aside from political balances and electoral arithmetic, other dynamics can also complicate al-Maliki’s hopes of a third term, primarily the Sadrists. As stated earlier, Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement has been out of politics for close to five years. However, during these years, al-Sadr has made a point of reminding political rivals, mainly the CF, of his influence. Through different justifications, from supporting Gaza, to most recently, a unified Friday prayer, al-Sadr has demonstrated his ability to mobilise millions to the streets in a short amount of time. Furthermore, if al-Sadr’s relations with the CF have soured over the past few years, his relationship with al-Maliki has been hostile for close to two decades, since the latter launched an operation against the Sadrist militias in 2008 and continued until the Sadrist withdrawal from politics in 2022. Therefore, a third term of al-Maliki could potentially risk an unfavourable -and possibly violent- return of the Sadrists to politics.

Moreover, another actor that may influence al-Maliki’s nomination is the marji’iyya of al-Najaf. The religious authority of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who is followed by millions of Iraq’s Shia Muslims, has played a role in preventing al-Maliki from assuming a third term in 2014 and again in 2018. Although the marji’iyyausually refrains from intervening in politics, a public statement issued by the Ayatollah could once again thwart al-Maliki’s hopes.

Possible Impact on Foreign Relations:

            The government of al-Sudani has pursued a delicate balancing policy in its foreign relations, specifically with the US and Iran. This approach is feasible in part due to al-Sudani’s seemingly ambiguous orientation. With al-Maliki, the perception would be an Iran-friendly government, which would increase the cost of his premiership from the outset. Regardless of al-Maliki’s intentions, even if he were to attempt to walk a tightrope akin to al-Sudani, his prior time in office as well as his perceived affinity toward Iran, is expected to cast its shadow on Iraq’s relations with the US. As demonstrated through Trump’s post, the US has expressed its opposition to al-Maliki’s possible return. Although it is unclear whether al-Maliki would shift Iraq’s regional alignment, the US seems to be uninterested in the unpredictability his return might bring. Here, it is important not to overestimate or underestimate the US's role. Within Iraq’s delicate dynamics, Washington can apply pressure and significantly increase the costs of certain policies, but it is not the sole arbiter of the country’s politics. Therefore, the CF still has to make its own hard decisions on the identity of the next government.

            In the same way that al-Maliki is perceived to threaten US interests, he is perceived to preserve Iran’s interests. Given its deteriorating influence in the region, Iran would prefer a familiar face in Iraq. Although it is unclear if al-Maliki could provide Iran with the needed assistance in the case of renewed confrontation with the US and Israel. His presence in Iraq’s top executive post would reassure Iranian leaders of a manageable presence in its western neighbour. Nevertheless, likewise with US influence, Iran’s impact on al-Maliki, the CF, or Iraq at large should not be taken out of context. Iraqi politics can rarely be rationalised through ideological absolutes and this is no different. Al-Maliki's election for a third term would not automatically mean that Iran has “secured” Iraq within its sphere of influence. It could mean that Iran’s allies in Iraq are rallying behind a strongman. All things considered, with the pressure being mounted on Iran, the post of Iraq’s Prime Minister might prove to be of minor significance in the grand scheme of things.

            Over the past few years, al-Sudani’s government has worked to deepen cooperation with regional players. This is observed in the country’s Development Road project, which aims to provide a commercial road to European markets via Iraq. The project is already supported by Qatar, the UAE, and Turkey. Al-Sudani has worked towards improving Iraq’s relations with the GCC. With regard to the government formation process, al-Maliki’s return could be seen negatively by Iraq’s Arab Gulf neighbours. Here, the character of al-Maliki becomes crucial. During his previous terms, al-Maliki openly antagonised GCC states, accusing them of waging war against Iraq by funding terrorism. Therefore, regardless of whether certain nuances and contexts change al-Maliki’s rhetoric and approach, a lack of personal trust can potentially reignite past anxieties and negatively impact al-Sudani’s approach to cooperation with the GCC.

Conclusion:

            Iraq’s government formation processes are particularly tumultuous and complicated. Al-Maliki’s possible return and al-Sudani’s withdrawal reveal vital features of the process. Coalition balances, power dynamics, and external influences all play a role in determining the future government. What is especially interesting in the aftermath of the November 2025 Parliamentary elections is the solidification of the muhasasa system of ethno-sectarian consociationalism. Political elites seem to have abandoned, in all but name, the façade of democracy in post-2003 Iraq. Opting for delicate balances based on power dynamics, with elections serving as a referendum on the influence of political actors. This is evident not only in the competition over the Premiership but also in the election of the Speaker of the Parliament, which was conducted on the basis of internal party consensus, and in the ongoing deadlock over the Presidency, which is due to a lack of agreement, both of which disregard democratic practice.

Since the Sadrist withdrawal from politics, the aforementioned arrangement became possible. However, having the country’s largest single political actor outside of politics hardly reflects a stable and sustainable political system. Moreover, al-Maliki, a figure under whose leadership sectarian violence peaked and a third of the country was lost to terrorist groups, his resurgence to possibly assume the state’s highest executive office should not be seen as a malfunction in the system. Rather, it is working as intended. Albeit it is a flawed system. Unless Iraq’s political elites recognise the inherent contradiction marring the country’s political order, the sustainability of the system will remain in question.

Note: The views, opinions, and information presented in this research reflect the author’s perspective and do not necessarily represent the views of New Ground Research. If you have any questions regarding references to our publications or other materials from our website, please contact us: Info@newgroundresearch.com

[1] Articles 54, 72, and 76 of the Iraqi constitution define these limits

[2] Government formation processes are traditionally elongated. It took 290 days to form the government following the 2010 elections, 131 after 2014, 143 after 2018, and 382 following the 2021 elections.

[3] Within Iraq’s post-2003 informal system of ethno-sectarian consociationalism, al-muhasasa al-ta’ifiyyia, the post of the president of the republic is typically reserved for an ethnic Kurd, while the posts of prime minister and speaker of the parliament are reserved for Shia and Sunni Arabs, respectively.