Iraqi Parliamentary Elections 2025: Key Features and Implications

Abdulla Al-Khazraji

Guest Contributor

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English Abstract

Iraq held its sixth post-2003 parliamentary elections on the 11th of November. More than 7,700 candidates divided between 69 party and alliance as well as 75 candidates running independently competed over the Council of Representatives’ 329 seats. The elections come at a peculiar regional situation characterized by tension and uncertainty. They could also be seen as a referendum on the power each political actor has on the ground as well as on the performance of the government of Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani and the -mostly- Iran-affiliated Coordination Framework (CF). Ultimately, the formation of government following the elections remains uncertain and subject to a complicated process.

This article aims at highlighting the background and significance of the elections, underlining key issues of the elections, and highlighting regional implications and possible scenarios to the elections.

Resúmen en español

Irak celebró sus sextas elecciones parlamentarias desde 2003 el 11 de noviembre. Más de 7.700 candidatos, repartidos entre 69 partidos y alianzas, así como 75 candidatos que concurrieron de forma independiente, compitieron por los 329 escaños del Consejo de Representantes. Las elecciones tienen lugar en una coyuntura regional peculiar, caracterizada por la tensión y la incertidumbre. También pueden interpretarse como un referéndum sobre el poder que cada actor político tiene sobre el terreno, así como sobre el desempeño del gobierno de Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani y del —mayoritariamente vinculado a Irán— Marco de Coordinación (CF, por sus siglas en inglés). En última instancia, la formación de gobierno tras las elecciones sigue siendo incierta y está sujeta a un proceso complejo.Este artículo tiene como objetivo destacar los antecedentes y la importancia de estas elecciones, subrayar sus cuestiones clave y poner de relieve las implicaciones regionales y los posibles escenarios derivados de los comicios.

ملخص المقال باللغة العربية

عُقِدت في العراق الانتخابات البرلمانية السادسة بعد العام 2003، وذلك في الحادي عشر من نوفمبر الجاري. وتنافس أكثر من 7700 مرشح، موزعين على 69 حزبًا وتحالفًا، بالإضافة إلى 75 مرشحًا مستقلًا، على مقاعد مجلس النواب البالغ عددها 329 مقعدًا. وتأتي هذه الانتخابات في ظل وضع إقليمي استثنائي يسوده التوتر وعدم اليقين. كما يُمكن اعتبارها استفتاءً على نفوذ كل طرف سياسي على الأرض، وعلى أداء حكومة رئيس الوزراء محمد شياع السوداني وتحالف الإطار التنسيقي ذي الولاء الإيراني في معظمه.

ويهدف هذا المقال إلى تسليط الضوء على خلفية الانتخابات وأهميتها، وتسليط الضوء على القضايا الرئيسية المتعلقة بها، وتسليط الضوء على التداعيات الإقليمية والسيناريوهات المحتملة لها.

Background and Significance

The significance of the election cannot be competently grasped without looking back at the previous election, which gave way to the current political arrangement. The 2021 early elections, which were a result of the Tishreen protest movement, were followed by a long and tumultuous government formation process. Eventually, the withdrawal of the Sadrist movement from politics gave way for the rise of the Coordination Framework to lead the government formation process. Today, after four years have passed, the CF still constitutes the backbone of parliamentary support to Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani’s government. However, differences within the coalition cannot be ignored. These differences are best represented by the fact that Al-Sudani, along with other members of the CF such as the head of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Falih Al-Fayyadh have decided to run in a list independent from their allies within the coalition, the “Reconstruction and Development Alliance.”

            On the other hand, another feature that brings to mind the particularities of the previous elections is the electoral law. The early elections which were held in 2021 followed a then-new electoral law based on the Single Non-Transferrable Vote casting method and the First-Past-The-Post vote counting method. That law constituted a significant shift away from previous list-based/modified Sainte Laguë voting which was used in 2018. That drastic shift was a result of the Tishreen protest movement which called for a law that better represents smaller parties and local independent candidates. Therefore, as soon as traditional political forces regained their grip over political dynamics, they passed a “new” electoral law in 2023 which overturns all the changes enacted by the previous law. As things stand, the 2025 elections divide Iraq into 18 electoral constituencies split along provincial lines[1], as well as utilizing a modified Sainte Laguë method with an initial divisor of 1.7 to count votes. This, along with an open list vote casting method and the division of constituencies complicates the chances of smaller parties and independent candidates with limited capacity to run nationwide or provincewide.

The November elections are set to be held under a highly polarized regional atmosphere which is exemplified by Israel’s genocide in Gaza. Israeli aggression on Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iran has undoubtedly laid its shadows over Iraqi politics. Al-Sudani’s government has attempted – to varying degrees of success— to navigate regional developments and avoid the entanglement of Iraq into the abovementioned conflict. This can be observed through pleading with Iran-affiliated armed groups to refrain from launching attacks on Israel or American interests and relying on its political and security relations with the US to restrain Israel – and itself— from targeting Iraqi armed groups. Thus, it can be argued that the elections can serve as a referendum on the CF in general, and the government of Al-Sudani specifically, and their ability to manage Iraq’s foreign policy.

            In Iraq’s post-2003 consociational muhasasa system, power is distributed between the country’s main ethno-religious identities, the Shia Arabs, the Sunni Arabs, and the Sunni Kurds. The main contenders in elections recognize this dichotomy and rarely attempt to vie for votes from differing ethno-religious backgrounds. For the Shia vote, it seems that the biggest contenders are members of the CF. An interesting development is that members of the CF are running independently against one another. This can be seen as “self-destructive” for the CF, as running multiple lists in the same constituents on somewhat similar platforms would usually serve in fragmenting the vote and losing seats in the elections. However, taking into consideration current dynamics exemplified by the absence of any strong contender for the Shia vote, i.e., the departure of the Sadrist Movement – now called the National Shiite Movement – from politics, paints a different picture. It seems that members of the CF decided to run independently to underline each member’s influence on the ground and have that be reflected within the coalition’s internal dynamics. It should be noted that during Iraq’s Provincial Councils elections in 2023, the CF pursued a similar approach.

            Political forces competing for the vote of other major ethno-religious identities have similarly opted to mostly participate in independent lists rather than large scale alliances. For the Sunni Arab vote three main contenders arise: Progress Party headed by former speaker of the parliament Mohammed Al-Halbousi; Sovereignty Alliance led by Khamis Al-Khanjar; and Azm Alliance headed by Muthanna Al-Samarrai. As for the competition over the Kurdish vote, in a similar manner the two major Kurdish parties, the KDP led by the Masoud Barzani and the PUK led by Bafel Talabani, have decided to also run independent lists. Other than the major political forces, some non-sectarian “anti-establishment” have arisen. In this regard, the most prominent is the Alternative Alliance, which is an alliance between multiple parties and movements such as the Iraqi Communist Party and the liberal Iraqi Loyalty Movement.

Key Features

            The main features if the 2025 parliamentary elections can be grouped into three categories: the IHEC’s policies; boycotts; and polarization. Firstly, the polices of the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) which is the judicial body responsible for organizing elections in Iraq has raised some questions. In this round of elections, a rising trend of disqualifications can be observed. Previously the commission would disqualify a limited number of candidates due to technical reasons such as failure to comply with designated deadlines or lack of required documents or degrees. However, during the buildup for the 2025 parliamentary elections, the IHEC have significantly increased the number of disqualified candidates compared to previous elections. In addition, the rationale behind the disqualifications seems to be more politically motivated. For instance, instead of technical reasons, a substantial number of candidates were disqualified “in compliance with the decisions of the supreme national commission for Accountability and Justice” which is the body responsible for “de-Baathification” in Iraq.

Another loose-fitted and liberally defined standard that the IHEC cited for disqualifications was the condition of “good conduct and behavior.” Although article 2 of the Candidate registration and approval system No.3 for 2025 states that: “[a candidate must have] good conduct and behavior, not convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor” it does not detail what is meant by “good conduct and behavior” which opens the door to arbitrarily disqualify candidates who the commission -or maybe the government- deem not fit. The vagueness of the criteria has resulted in candidates being disqualified and then reinstated after they appeal the decision. A prime example of this is Sajjad Salim, an opposition member of parliament who won in 2021 following the Tishreen uprising, Salim was disqualified by the IHEC twice and then reinstated twice following appeals.

By mid-October, the commission’s heightened spree of disqualifications had led to barring more than 800 candidates from participating in the elections. However, it is important to note that if we can argue that the disqualifications are part of a larger policy, then reinstating them is also part of that policy. As stated earlier, several candidates were disqualified due to previous affiliation with the Ba’ath Party and then were reinstated following appeals, of these reinstated candidates 61%[2] were candidates of CF or were members of political wings of armed groups, if not both.

The second feature that is particularly interesting about the elections lies not with who is participating but rather with who is not. While the Sadrist withdrawal from politics did pave the way for the CF to take over the Shiite share of power within Iraq’s post-2003 consociational muhasasa system, it also however, negatively impacted the legitimacy of the entire political process. The continuous Sadrist boycott of politics including the elections remains a looming threat to the CF. The presence of -arguably- the country’s largest political group outside of the political process undoubtedly occupies the CF with the possibility of a violent -not so political- Sadrist return into politics. In addition to the Sadrists, former prime minister Haider Al-Abadi’s Victory Alliance has also opted to boycott citing “the chaos of political money.”

The politically motivated boycott paired with a general feeling of apathy and disillusionment among voters meant that a lower voter turnout rate was to be expected. However, what happened on election was unexpected. Following the closure of voting stations, the IHEC announced that the turnout rate had exceeded 55% (see table 1). This rate is not only unforeseen due to the Sadrist boycott. It is especially interesting given that it marks the first time in 11 years since the voter turnout rate exceeded 50% in the 2014 parliamentary elections (60.5%). The 2025 parliamentary elections break the trend of dwindling turnout rates from election to another (79% in 2005; 62% in 2010; 60% in 2014; 44.5% in 2018; and 41% in 2021).

Total number of eligible voters: 21,40,291

Total number of votes casted: 12,009,453

Overall turnout rate: 56.11%

Constituent	Turnout Rate
Baghdad – Rasafa	41.55%
Baghdad – Karkh	53.27%
Nineveh	64.07%
Basra	50.21%
Sulaymaniyah	56.87%
Dhi Qar	47.94%
Babylon	49.82%
Erbil	69.02%
Al-Anbar	65.93%
Diyala	55.49%
Kirkuk	64.12%
Salahuddin	66.44%
Najaf	42.70%
Karbala	46.13%
Wasit	46.76%
Qadisiya	48.39%
Duhok	76.07%
Maysan	40.11%
Muthanna	49.79%

The figures listed above tell an interesting story. The turnout rate was not uniform across Iraq’s 18 constituencies. A contrast between the country’s northern and southern provinces is observable. In the Sunni Arab majority provinces north and west of the country have a collective turnout rate of approximately 63%. Similarly, the northern-most Kurdish majority provinces have a collective turnout rate of roughly 67%. While on the other hand, the collective turnout rate of the country’s Shiite majority central and southern provinces is around 47%. These figures suggest two things. First, that the Sadrist boycott of the election did impact the turnout rate in Iraq’s central and southern provinces. And second, that even if the turnout rate in all of Iraq was as low as the central and southern constituents, it still would be a higher turnout rate than the two previous parliamentary elections. Which indicates a deeper shift that should be further investigated.

This surprising development can be rationalized through the third feature of the elections; polarization. The elections saw a resurgence of populist speech and sectarianism. Campaigns pursued by political forces utilized highly polarized, ethno-sectarian speech. For instance, the Coalition of National State Forces led by cleric Ammar Al-Hakim ran under the slogan of “do not forfeit it” insinuating that Shiite voters should vote in order to not relinquish control over the state, an overtly sectarian slogan that attempts to alienate Shiite Iraqis from the remainder of citizens. Likewise, Al-Halbousi’s Progress Party ran under the slogan of “we are a nation” referring to Sunni Arabs as an independent sector of Iraqi society. In a similar manner, Kurdish parties attempted to mobilize their voters by appealing to their ethnic identity. This is particularly observable in Kurdish parties’ campaigning in Kirkuk. The province that lies at the center of the debate on disputed areas between the Kurdistan Region and Iraq’s central government saw robust campaigning. Masrour Barzani, the prime minister of the regional government stated that the city was “the heart of Kurdistan” and that the KDP “will not let it go.”  This polarizing speech led to clashes in Kirkuk between Kurds and Turkmen which killed two security officers.

Another factor that can be utilized in order to rationalize the increase in turnout rate is the overall population increase. Between 2021 and 2025, 4 million citizens born between 2004 and 2007 turned 18, thus increasing the total number of eligible voters from 25 million to 29 million. additionally, the number of eligible voters who did renew and obtain their biometric electoral cards can also further contextualize the turnout rate. In 2021, out of 25 million eligible voters, 22 million obtained biometric cards, while in this election, out of 29 million, 21 million voters renewed and obtained their biometric cards. Furthermore, the rise in the overall turnout rate can also be rationalized through Iraq’s –relative –internal stability. in the past four years, the CF-backed government of Al-Sudani has worked – to varying levels of success— on preserving stability in the country. Compared to the buildup to the 2018 and 2021 elections characterized by the war to liberate the country from ISIS and widespread protests, the 2025 elections were held under stable conditions, which might have contributed to the increased turnout rate. Therefore, the aforementioned reasons can be utilized to provide a better understanding of the shifts in voter turnout rate.

Regional Implications and Possible Scenarios

The 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections are not only expected to reshape Iraq’s internal political landscape[3], it is also expected to determine the country’s position on regional developments and vis-à-vis regional and international actors. The regional implications and possible scenarios following the elections can be categorized into three interrelated groups: redefining foreign relations; the position of the PMF and armed groups; and the government formation process. On Iraq’s regional standing and foreign relations, the relations with Iran and the US are the most prominent. Iran’s weakened regional status following the loss of its Syrian ally, the deteriorating position of Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and its confrontation with Israel makes the results of its Iraqi allies in the elections all the more important. If the members of the Iran-affiliated CF are able to muster up the needed parliamentarian majority to form a government, Iran will guarantee an ally in Iraq that can assist it in evading sanctions, and –if needed –assist militarily in future confrontations with Israel. However, if Prime Minister Al-Sudani was able to secure a second term, successfully capitalizing on his alliance’s win in the elections with approximately 46 seats, Iraq’s stance towards Iran is expected to remain carefully balanced. Likely continuing to tread a fine line between cooperation and restraint.

            The current elections also shed light on the question of relations with the United States. Nevertheless, the significance of this question should not be exaggerated. As it is not expected that relations with the US are going sour with the introduction of a new government. It should not be forgotten that the government of Al-Sudani was hailed as the government of the “resistance” before it expanded Iraq’s commercial relations with the US. Although members of the CF have presented an opposing image to the US, they have, for the most part, not actively pursued an anti-US stance. Therefore, it is unlikely that Iraq’s next government will seek to deteriorate relations with the US. However, in the unlikely case of the formation of an overtly pro-US government or completely sidelining Iran-allied forces from the government, members of the CF and the “Axis of Resistance” within Iraq would be expected to target US interests in Iraq and the region. On a regional scope, the resulting government will be faced with a decision to make regarding Iraq’s stance on and level of involvement with the Israeli aggression in the region. A second term for Al-Sudani or a similarly “moderate” government will attempt to continue the current government’s delicate balance policy.

On the other hand, while even a more “radical,” anti- US, pro-Iran government might not seek to engage Iraq in a future confrontation between Iran and Israel, it could prove critical in providing logistical support, as well as offer another front for Iran and its allies to use.

Another question the next government will be faced with is the fate of the PMF and armed groups residing outside of state control. Recently the government decided to withdraw the PMF law from parliament, preferring to transfer the vote to the next parliament. The law, which the US publicly voiced opposition to, has garnered concerns that it seeks to legitimize a revolutionary guard-esque presence in Iraqi politics. Although, the vote on the law has been postponed, the next government will eventually have to address it. Passing the law as it is, seems to be opposed by the US as well as Sunni and Kurdish forces. While on the other hand, the notion of dissolving the PMF also seems unrealistic. Especially given that political wings of armed groups were able to solidify their presence in the council of representatives by approximately 56 seats divided between Asaib Ahl AlHaqq’s Sadiqoun (the truthful) Movement (27); Badr Organization (18); Kataib Hezbollah’s Huquq (rights) Movement (6); and Imam Ali Brigades’ Khadamat (services) Alliance (5). A more realistic scenario seems to include passing a revised version of the law, in which the PMF are reorganized and rebranded as more professional while still giving them organizational independence and room to maneuver.

            The elections are one process, and the formation of government is a completely different process. Government formation processes in Iraq are famously long and tumultuous. While these elections might have broken the downward trend in voter turnout, it is uncertain however that it would be able to evade the tradition of long government formation processes. It took 290 days to form the government following the 2010 elections, 131 after 2014, 143 after 2018, and 382 following the 2021 elections. Moreover, another tradition that PM Al-Sudani will need to overcome to secure a second term is the fact that the single coalition wining the most seats is usually denied the right to form the government. In 2010, Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiyya list won 91 seats, but the State of Law Coalition’s Nouri Al-Maliki ended up forming the government; in 2014 Al-Maliki’s list won 92 seats, but Al-Abadi formed the government; in 2018 the Sadrist Saairoun list won 54 seats, but was only able to participate in a consensus-based government under Adil Abdul Mahdi; and most recently, in 2021 the Sadrists won 73 seats, and failed in forming a majority government which led to Al-Sudani’s current government.

Conclusion

            Iraq’s sixth parliamentary elections are set to reshuffle the share of power in the council of representatives while preserving the same faces for the most part. Held under a volatile situation regionally, the elections could reaffirm or drift away from Al-Sudani’s balancing act. The elections also underlined that the electoral process remains a key component in reflecting power in Iraq’s political muhasasa consociational system. Cutting away from established trends, the elections also highlighted that although the country’s largest political force opted to boycott, high political polarization utilizing populism and sectarianism were -in part- successful in achieving a significant increase in voter turnout rate, despite projections of the opposite.

            Regionally and internationally, it seems that Iran and its local allies might attempt to solidify their presence in both the legislative and executive branches. While on the other hand, US interests do not seem to be under direct threat by the country’s leading political forces. In fact, a more moderate government rather than a pro-US one should be able to balance Iraq’s foreign policies. However, it also should be noted that the stability and sustainability of Iraq’s political system remain fragile due to varying internal and external factors. Therefore, if Israel -and the US- were to renew their aggression on Iran, the behavior of Iraqi armed groups allied with Iran might be difficult to predict. All in all, what can be said is that although the elections concluded, what comes next is an entire ordeal. The outcome of these elections in terms of who forms and heads the next government remains -in line with tradition- uncertain and subject to a complicated process.

[1] Although the Iraqi Council of Representatives recognized Halabja as the country’s 19th province in April, it will not serve as an independent electoral district because the November elections will be held in accordance with law No. 4 for 2023, which does not recognize Halabja as a governorate independent from Sulaymaniyah.

[2] This figure was calculated by the author based on data provided by the IHEC up until October.

[3] The projected seat distribution based on the election’ preliminary results can be accessed here. Although it should be noted that categorizing lists based on ethno-religious identities can be misleading as several lists include candidates -and winners- of diverse ethno-religious backgrounds.

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